Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 11

2012

An Empirical Assessment of the Performance and Competitive
Effects of Los Angeles County Charter Schools
Sam Trachtman
Pomona College, sam.trachtman@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer
Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational
Sociology Commons, Other Economics Commons, and the Public Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Trachtman, Sam (2012) "An Empirical Assessment of the Performance and Competitive
Effects of Los Angeles County Charter Schools," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 9 :
Iss. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/11

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

An Empirical Assessment of the Performance and Competitive Effects of Los
Angeles County Charter Schools
Abstract
This paper evaluates the performance of charter elementary schools in Los Angeles County in three ways.
First, I compare charter school performance to public school performance, controlling for a number of key
characteristics. Second, I study the characteristics that appear to influence charter school success as
compared to public school success. Third, I study the “competitive effect” of charter schools, examining
how geographical proximity to charter schools affects the performance of traditional public schools. I find
evidence that, ceteris paribus, traditional public schools score higher than charter schools, except in
majority African American schools. Further, I find that the opening of charter schools affects nearby
traditional public schools negatively.
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Introduction
One of the rallying calls of proponents of “school choice” reforms is that
introducing competition into the school system will improve the effectiveness of teachers
and principals, and enhance overall student achievement. Central to the school choice
movement is the advent of charter schools, schools funded publicly but operated largely
privately. Charter school legislation was first passed in 1991. Since then over 4700
charter schools have been introduced in 40 states (CREDO, 2009). In addition, President
Obama has made charter schools one of the focal points of his education agenda.
The growth of charter schools has fueled a national debate about the advantages
and disadvantages of a more market-based public school system. Advocates of the charter
school movement argue that charter schools not only provide attendees with a higher
quality education, but also spur nearby traditional public schools (TPS) to higher
performance through a competitive effect. Opponents argue that charter schools
undermine the goals and ideals of public education, and do not perform better than
traditional public schools. I use data from Los Angeles County elementary schools to test
empirically 1) whether charter schools indeed outperform traditional public schools, 2)
what sorts of elementary charter schools have been most successful in L.A., and 3)
whether the introduction of charter schools causes nearby traditional public schools to
perform better (what I call the competitive effect).
Background
Charter schools receive public funding, but are not subject to all the regulations
imposed on traditional public schools. They remain accountable, though, to their local
school board or state sponsoring agency, with low performance often leading to closure.
High-demand, oversubscribed charter schools admit students based on a lottery system,
not on previous grades or test scores. In 26 states and Washington, DC, the number of
charter schools that can exist at any point is capped, which can lead to oversubscription
and long charter school wait lists (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009).
Charter schools, on average, receive less funding per pupil than similar public schools;
however, they often do not enroll as many students requiring special education or support
services. A 2008 study on charter school funding in 40 states and Washington, DC found
charter school funding to average just $6,585 per student annually, compared with
$10,771 at TPSs (Center for Education Reform, 2008).
California passed legislation allowing for the introduction of charter schools in
1992, preceded only by Minnesota. Since then, California has become home to more
charter schools than any other state. Original legislation in the Charter Schools Act
restricted the number of charters in California to 100. This cap was later amended in 1998
to allow an additional 100 charter schools each year. As of 2006, 1 out of 20 public
schools in California was a charter school, and 1 out of 50 students attended charter
schools (American Institutes for Research, 2006). California’s charter schools are
concentrated in urban areas, with LAUSD (Los Angeles Unified School District) by far
the most charter-friendly district in the state. Los Angeles County has in total over 270
charter schools (California Department of Education, 2012).

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

1

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 11

Charter schools are established by business-people, parents, or other community
members interested in starting and running a school. In order to open a school in
California, founders must present their ideas and strategies to the governing board of their
home school district. If the petition is approved on a local level, the proposal is then
submitted to the State Department of Education. At this point, the petitioners apply for an
implementation grant. If approved, the school is funded by the state, with the amount of
funding generally based on average attendance (proposed attendance in a school’s first
year). After the expiration of the first five-year term, the school must be reapproved by
the school board in order to retain funding (Wok, 2012).
If a charter school’s initial petition is denied, the founders can try to improve their
petition and reapply, or they can appeal to the County Office of Education. According to
a representative of the California Department of Education (CDE), petitions are judged
based on their satisfaction of legal requirements, their comprehensiveness, and the
capability of the people making the petition (Wok, 2012). According to the CDE
representative, the biggest hurdle in general for potential charter schools is finding a
suitable facility.
Literature Review
There is not a consensus in the existing literature on whether charter schools
outperform traditional public schools. There is also not a consensus on whether charter
schools exert a positive competitive effect. Further, there has yet to be published a study
specifically of Los Angeles schools, although several studies have investigated the whole
of California’s charter schools. The most comprehensive, up-to-date study of charter
school effectiveness is a 2009 study by the Stanford Center for Research on Educational
Outcomes (CREDO, 2009). The study, using data from 16 states as well as Washington
D.C., did not find charter schools to consistently outperform or under-perform traditional
public schools. In five states, charter schools statistically significantly outperformed
TPSs, while in six states TPSs outperformed charter schools. In the remaining states
results were inconclusive. Some other interesting findings were that elementary and
middle school charters on average performed better (compared to traditional public
school counterparts) than charter high schools. Further, charter schools were found to be
more effective for students who had spent several years at the school already.
In California specifically, a 2005 RAND study found students in start-up charters
to outperform comparable traditional public school students (Zimmer, 2005). However,
conversion charters (charters converted from TPSs vs. opened independently) did not
outperform traditional public schools. Further, charter schools with some independent
study or distance-learning component performed worse than traditional public schools.
The study also found no measurable competitive effect when looking at the whole of
California’s charter schools.
Studies comparing charter school and traditional public school performance
generally use OLS models. One potential issue with such studies is that students will selfselect into charter schools or traditional public schools, introducing the problem of
omitted variable bias. To correct for this problem, analyses generally control for student
body indicators such as race, percentage of students on free or reduced lunch programs,
and student-teacher ratio. Studies have shown that, in California, charter schools do not
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generally “skim” high-performing students from traditional public schools (American
Institutes for Research, 2006). On the contrary, charter school students are generally
lower-performing, due partly to the fact that charter schools are often in poorer, urban
areas. If student level data are available, researchers often also use student fixed-effects,
through which they can track individual students, in order to neutralize this source of
selection bias.
There is only a small body of literature assessing the charter school competitive
effect. Hoxby (2003) provided the first major study of competitive charter school effects,
focusing specifically on charter schools in Michigan and Arizona. She finds charter
school introduction to have a positive, statistically significant competitive effect on
nearby traditional public schools. Bettinger (2005) also tests Michigan charters, using an
instrumental variable to control for school placement, and fails to find a robust
competitive effect. Bifulco and Ladd (2006), looking at North Carolina charters, also fail
to find a robust competitive effect. However, Booker et al (2006) and Sass (2006) find a
small, positive competitive effect in Texas and Florida, respectively. Buddin and Zimmer
(2010) fail to find a competitive effect of charter school introduction in California.
Buddin and Zimmer also use interviews with TPS principals to add qualitative depth to
their study. They find that principals, in general, feel little competitive pressure from the
opening of charter schools. Most recently, Imberman (2011) finds that charter school
openings have a negative effect on TPS performance at the elementary level, but a
positive competitive effect at the middle and high school level.
The main econometric issue one encounters in studying the competitive effect is
endogeneity associated with time and location of charter school openings. The problem,
in theory, is that the location of charter schools is not randomly determined; rather,
charter schools locate (temporally and spatially) in areas where schools are doing poorly.
If charter schools aim to substitute for public schools where public schools are not doing
a satisfactory job, then charter schools will generally open in areas with low TPS
performance. According to this theory, any analysis of competitive effects failing to
account for endogeneity of school location would likely find charter school openings to
be correlated with low TPS performance.
The competitive effects studies in general use a difference-in-difference approach
to reduce the issue of endogeneity in estimating the competitive effect. Another method
to control for endogeneity is to instrument for charter school opening. Bettinger (2005)
and Imberman (2011) employ this technique, with Bettinger using the instrumental
variable (IV) of proximity to a university, and Imberman using an IV based on property
available in a specific area. Bettinger and Imberman select variables (proximity to a
university and number of properties near a TPS with between 20,000 and 100,000 square
feet of building space respectively) that they argue are correlated with the opening of a
charter school, and correlated with performance of nearby public schools only through
the mechanism of charter openings (the exclusion restriction). In the first stage of the
2SLS regression, they estimate the opening of charter schools based on their respective
instrumental variables. In the second stage, they estimate the impact of the opening of
charter schools on TPS performance, using results from the first stage as right hand side
variables. This technique accounts for endogeneity, and gives an unbiased estimate of the
impact of charter schools on nearby TPSs.
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Due to difficulty in finding a suitable IV, this study resolves the endogeneity issue
by both measuring changes in TPS performance (as opposed to levels) as the dependent
variable, and also by controlling for past performance of TPSs. Given that any
endogeneity due to past changes in API performance is captured by lags, this study
should not suffer from bias due to endogeneity.
School Choice and Competitive Effects Theories
This study tests two theories: first, that charters achieve higher levels of
performance than TPSs, and second, that the introduction of charter schools results in
better outcomes for nearby traditional public schools. In this section, I further explore the
economic roots of the theories, and explore a few reasons why they may not actually
apply to charter school implementation in the U.S.
The notion that charter schools should perform better than traditional public
schools stems from the idea that markets promote efficiency. While charter schools in
California are subject to many of the same rules and regulations as traditional public
schools, they also have more scope to operate independently. Charter schools are less
subject to inefficiencies posed by the teachers’ union, are less restricted in terms of
curriculum, and are able to experiment with innovative methods like extending the school
day (American Institutes for Research, 2006). Despite these factors, the existing literature
does not support the hypothesis that charter schools consistently outperform traditional
public schools. This may be due to low levels of information for “choosers” (parents),
student composition bias, lower funding levels, or simply the fact that choice does not
always promote better outcomes.
The theory that charter school openings should impact TPSs positively views
schools and families, at least in part, as rational, utility-maximizing actors. Most
basically, parents try to maximize the educational gains for their children through school
selection, and schools aim to maintain the public funding that will allow them to remain
open.
With the above assumptions in place, one can model the performance of public
schools as a function of, among other variables, the competition that they face for public
funding. If “funding follows the student,” one can then equate competition for public
funding with competition for students (Hoxby, 2003). In this model, enhancing the level
of competition for students in a certain district by introducing charter schools should spur
public schools to improve their performance.
However, there are several reasons to think that the “school competition” model
does not aptly describe public school dynamics in the U.S. For one, the argument has
been made that teachers do not need externally imposed incentives because of an intrinsic
drive to educate students. Further, they are already held accountable through “standards
based education reform,” a key attribute of NCLB in which public schools are held
accountable for providing students with a certain level of proficiency as measured by
standardized testing. While these sources of motivation may be enough for some
teachers, it is likely that some teachers do respond to external, economic incentives.
Additionally, even teachers who are largely self-motivated are not immune to external
incentives.
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Second, researchers must also take into account the level of the incentives at play.
If a principal at a traditional public school feels competition from a nearby charter, the
question remains whether he/she will be able to marshal meaningful incentives to relay
the competitive effect to teachers, whose actions are ultimately responsible, to a large
degree, for student learning.
Third, a competitive effect will only take hold in a policy environment where the
“money follows the student” (Hoxby, 2003). If failing schools lose students to charter
schools, but are then provided additional funding in order to fix their deficiencies,
teachers at the failing schools will not have any incentive to improve. In California,
however, while the school funding scheme is quite complex, money is generally awarded
to schools on a per-student basis (Bersin, 2008). While this sort of system may promote a
competitive effect, it may not be observed in the data. If schools that lose students to
charter schools also lose funding, the loss of funding will likely impact performance
negatively, possibly negating any competitive effect.
On the demand side, further reason to question the competitive effects theory is
that parents often do not have full information on the quality of schools in their district.
Even if they do, studies have shown that they frequently fail to respond to failing schools
by seeking alternatives like charter schools (CREDO, 2009). One reason may be that,
outside of the big names like KIPP, charter schools have not been shown to consistently
outperform traditional public schools. Further, issues of convenience, friends, and
uncertainty add additional costs to parents sending their child to a new school. In other
words, for parents to have their children switch schools, the new school must exceed the
old school in quality by more than the cost of the change.
Despite the myriad doubts, the “school competition” theory remains compelling,
and is worth testing empirically due to the implications of the results for the charter
school movement.
Data
This study uses yearly API scores from the CDE for Los Angeles County TPSs
and charter schools from 1998 through 2009, as well as CDE data on other school-level
variables such as percent of students on free or reduced lunch programs, student-teacher
ratio, and percentage minority. I selected 1998 to 2009 based on data availability, as well
as the fact that a large number of charter schools have opened over that period. The data
set contains a total of 11258 API score observations amongst 1208 LA County public and
charter schools.
The API is a single number, from 200 to 1000, reflecting a school’s performance
on statewide assessments in a number of academic areas. It was instituted as the
cornerstone of California’s 1999 Public Schools Accountability Act. The API score relies
heavily on standardize testing, primarily the CST and CAHSEE. However, it also takes
into account factors like attendance and graduation rates. Certain funding awards and
incentives are based on API improvement (CDE).
To construct the “charter competition” variables, I use Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) software to geo-code addresses from the CDE website for elementary
TPSs and charter schools. Geo-coding software takes the addresses and places them on a
map in the GIS program. I first create a 5-mile buffer around each public school, and
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create a variable indicating the number of charter schools within the buffer. I then
determine the closest charter school to each TPS, and record the distance as the crow
flies.
I also conducted two interviews. In the first, I talked with a CDE representative
about the process for starting a charter school. In the second, I talked with a teacher at a
traditional public school about competition from charter schools.
Models and Results
Part 1: Comparing Charter and TPS performance
In Part 1 of this study, I compare elementary charter school and TPS API score
performance from 1998 through 2009. Los Angeles County contains 84 elementary
charter schools, compared to 1224 elementary traditional public schools. Table 1 shows
several summary statistics with respect to these schools. Mean API score for charter
schools over the period was 788.92, with a low of 410.8 and a high of 910.6. Charter
schools, on average, sustained an annual increase of 14.5 API points, or 3.7 percentage
points. Charter schools tended to be substantially smaller than TPSs, with fewer students
on free or reduced lunches, fewer minority students, and smaller class sizes.
For traditional public schools, mean API score over the period was 719.92, with a
low of 311 and a high of 988. API score on average rose by 1.92 percentage points over
the period.
Figures 1 and 2 show no significantly disruptive outliers in API scores. The
Charter and TPS API distribution shown have a rightward skewness, reflecting more
variation in scores at the lower end of the distribution than at the upper end.
The base API regression for school i in year t is:
APIit=β1+ β2Charteri+ β3’Xit+ δt+ εit

(1)

Charter is a dummy variable indicating charter status, while Xit indicates a vector of
control variables, and δτ is a vector of year fixed effects. The control variables in the
basic regression include total enrollment, percentage of students on free or reduced
meals, percent of students from minority backgrounds, average pupils per teacher,
average class sizes, and a set of dummy variables for the most highly represented ethnic
group at the school.
I do not use lagged API on the right hand side because a Woodridge test for
autocorrelation indicates serial autocorrelation of error terms to be an issue, even when
including up to five lagged values of API. Keeping lagged API terms on the right hand
side would thus cause estimation bias.
While inspection of residuals does not immediately indicate heteroskedasticity, a
Breusch-Pagan test on the residuals of the base regression indicates that error terms are
heteroskedastic (chi-squared=104.21, p<.0001). I also need to account for the serial
correlation discussed above. Further, I adjust standard errors based on district clustering.
The standard errors I use are clustered and robust to serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity. The results of the base regression can be viewed in Table 2.
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Despite the fact that charter schools, on average, have higher API scores than
TPSs, the charter dummy shows up negative in the basic regression, with a coefficient of
-6.96. This result is not significant, though. The negative result is related to the control
variables. Charter schools, on average, have lower total enrollment, lower percentage of
students on free or reduced school lunches, and lower percentage of minority students
than traditional public schools. All three of these variables carry statistically significant
negative coefficients in the base regression. Thus, if charter schools had the same general
characteristics as TPSs, the model suggests they would score worse on the API. The R
squared for the base regression is .76, indicating that the chosen variables explain a good
deal of the variation in API scores. Consistent with previous studies, percentage minority
and percentage of students on free meals are negative predictors of API score, while
majority Asian is the strongest positive predictor of API score.
The results of the base regression are robust to transformations of the dependent
variable (API scores). I first use a log transformation of API (Column 2), which yields a
coefficient of -.0143 on the charter dummy, also insignificant at the 5% level. Second, I
use the change in API scores (Column 3) from one year to the next as the dependent
variable. With differences in API scores as the dependent variable, using four lagged
differences in API on the left hand side neutralizes serial correlation in the error term. I
thus include these terms in the regression, and also include one lagged API level term to
control for regression to the mean. This transformation yields a coefficient on the charter
dummy of -10.32, indicating that a school’s charter status results in a reduction in
improvement of over 10 points each year. Finally, I use percent change in API as the
dependent variable (Column 4), once again including four lagged values of the dependent
variable on the left hand side. The coefficient on charter status of -.649 is not statistically
significant.
In a second modification to the base regression, I introduce interaction variables
between the charter dummy and important control variables like pupils per teacher and
percentage of students on free or reduced meals. Introducing interactions controls not
only for characteristics of each school, but also for the impact of certain characteristics
when they are observed in charter schools. For example, the coefficient on the interaction
variable between minority and charter gives the impact on test scores of percent minority
specifically in charter schools. The regressions with interaction terms included can be
viewed in Table 3.
Including the interaction term in the model results in a substantial increase in the
magnitude of the negative charter coefficient. The coefficient on charter becomes
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. Coefficients are similarly larger with
transformations of API levels as dependent variables.
Interestingly, both the interaction between charter and majority black, the
interaction between charter and majority white, and the interaction between charter and
percentage minority turn out statistically significant and positive. This indicates that,
while charter status generally results in lower performance, the effect is mitigated if a
school is majority black, majority white, or has a high percentage of minority students.
Charter status has a highly negative impact (controlling for important characteristics) for
majority-Hispanic schools, which encompass 40% of LA County’s charter schools.
There are several potential challenges to these results. The largest is that, due to
lack of student-level data, I am not able to track the movement of students from TPSs to
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charter schools. In other words, I am not able to control for characteristics of students
outside of the control variables on the general characteristics of the schools. It could be
the case that there are unobservable characteristics of students who choose to go to
charter schools that are driving the results. If we think that charter school students tend to
have positive “unobservables,” then the charter school dummy should be even more
negative. If we think charter school students have negative “unobservables,” this might
explain the negative coefficient on the charter dummy.
Studies in California have shown, though, that charter schools do not seem to
skim higher-performing students from TPSs; rather, they seem to take on low-performing
students. (Buddin, 2006) This may be due to the fact that charter schools locate in poorer,
urban areas, where sudents are generally lower-performing on standardized tests. If this is
the case, the included controls should account for this effect. It could be though, that
other negative “unobservables” are driving the lower performance of charter schools,
which would call into question the findings of this study. Further student-level research is
necessary to determine whether this is indeed the case.
Part 2: Focusing on Charter School Performance
In Part 2 of this study, I focus specifically on charter school performance,
examining how charter schools differ from TPSs in terms of the factors that impact API
performance.
In order to test empirically the differences between charter school and TPS factors
that lead to API success, I run the base regression (Equation 1) first on the sample of
charter schools, and then on the set of observations encompassing only TPSs. Then, I
compare the coefficients from each regression, looking for significant differences. The
results of these regressions are in Table 4.
There are several coefficients that vary dependent on whether one looks at charter
or traditional public schools. Most striking is that amongst TPSs, the dummy variable
“black” is strongly negative (in both levels and % change), while in the charter set the
dummy variable shows up positive, although only weakly significant (10% level) due to
the small sample size. This is an interesting result, indicating that majority black schools,
on average, do far better if they are charter schools. Percentage minority also has a
statistically significant negative coefficient for TPSs, but a small positive coefficient for
charter schools. This indicates that, ceteris paribus, higher-minority schools will tend to
do better if they are chartered. While other coefficients, such as number of teachers and
pupils per teacher, vary as well, their variation is not statistically significant.
The descriptive statistics support the regression results that majority black schools
perform better if they are chartered. Table 5 shows that mean API for majority-black
TPSs over the period was just 663.72, but for majority-black charter schools was 757.01,
an increase of over 14%. While majority-white and majority-Hispanic schools also
performed better if they were chartered, the gains were not nearly as great as for
majority-Black, and can be attributed (based on previous regression results) to other
school and student composition characteristics.
Aside from school ethnic makeup, I am also interested in how the performance of
charter schools varies depending on two charter-specific variables: first, when the charter
school was opened, and second, whether the charter school is a startup or conversion.
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Startup charters are charter schools opened in a new location. Conversion charters, on the
other hand, are charter schools that were converted from TPSs or private schools. Around
60% of the charter elementary schools in LA County are startups, compared to 40%
conversion.
Charter schools in LA County are more likely to have been opened in recent
years, as Figure 3 demonstrates. A high number were opened shortly after charter
legislation in 1992, followed by a stretch of fewer openings lasting until around 2003.
From 2003 to 2010, a large number of charters were opened in each year.
In order to test the impact of number of years in existence and type, I restrict the
sample to charter schools, and run the base regression including the two new variables
(years_existed and type).
APIit=β1+ β2Years_existed + β3Type + β4Lagged_APIit+ β5’Xit+ δt+ εit

(2)

The results of this regression are reported in Table 6.
Judging by API levels, the number of years a charter school has existed
(calculated as 2012 minus the year the school was founded) positively affects
performance. While the coefficient of 1.4 is small, it is significant at the 5% level. It
indicates that, ceteris paribus, each year a charter school has existed will raise its API
score by 1.4 points. It makes intuitive sense that a charter school will improve as it
becomes more entrenched in a community. Further, the fact that a charter school has not
been closed after the five-year trial period indicates decent performance.
The coefficient on the dummy variable startup, on the other hand is strongly
negative. The coefficient on the variable startup indicates that ceteris paribus, a school
being a startup vs. a conversion charter decreases API score by around 71 points, and
decreases average yearly improvement by 7.7 percentage points. However, the result is
only significant with API levels as the dependent variable, and at the 10% level (due to
small sample size). This result indicates that the existing infrastructure that comes with
being a conversion charter school is beneficial to the school’s performance. It also runs
contrary to the findings of Buddin (2006).
The most important challenge for these results is, once again, the possibility of
omitted variable bias. It could be the case that the black variable for charter schools
reflects some characteristic of black students who attend charter schools that is not
captured by other control variables. For the data on startup vs. conversion, it is also
possible that there is some unobserved aspect of startup charter schools, such as bias in
geographical location, that leads to persistently lower API scores. That being said, the
results are quite convincing that charter schools are 1) better at educating black students
than TPSs, 2) generally do better when they are converted from traditional public schools
versus started up independently, and 3) improve with age.
Part 3: The Competitive Effect
In Part 3 of this study, I examine whether the geographic proximity of charter
schools has an impact on the performance of traditional public schools. To do so, I
generate several geography-related variables from GIS: 1) the name of the nearest charter
to each traditional public school, 2) the distance (in feet, as the crow flies) to that charter
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and 3) the number of charters in a 5-mile radius from each TPS. Figure 4 shows the
location of all elementary charter and TPSs in LA County. I also control for the distance
to the nearest private elementary school and the number of private elementary schools in
a 5-mile radius. These variables are meant to account for any competitive effect
stemming from private schools. Table 7 lists elementary charter schools in LA county,
and also gives the number of public schools for which they are set as the nearest charter
school.
The mean distance to the nearest charter school for a TPS is 38,770 ft, with a
minimum of 30 feet and a maximum of over 2 million feet. There are an average of 6
charter schools within a 5-mile radius of each TPS, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum
of 44. Both distance to and number of charter schools’ distributions are skewed to the
left, with long tails to the right (figures 5 and 6).
In order to test the impact of geographical proximity to charter schools on TPS
performance, I create variables reflecting characteristics of the nearest charter school.
First, I look at when the nearest charter school was opened. I create a dummy variable
called year_of, which registers as a 1 if the API being reported is in the year that the
nearest charter school was opened and a 0 otherwise. I continue creating a set of dummy
variables for each year following or preceding the opening of the nearest charter school.
These variables indicate the impact on API scores for being in the year “x” years before
or after the opening of a charter school nearby.
I run the base regression, except in this model I use percent changes in API as the
dependent variable, restrict the sample to TPSs, and include the discussed geographic
proximity variables. I only use differences (in percentage terms) here to reduce issues of
endogeneity, which I will discuss in a subsequent section. Due to lack of serial
correlation issues with the differenced variable on the left hand side, I am able to control
for lagged values. The following represents the model I test in this section.
%∆APIit=β1+ β2count + β3distance_charter + β4’year_open + β5’Lagged_%∆APIit+
β5’Xit+ δt+ εit
(3)
For each TPS in the sample, count gives the number of charter schools within a 5mile radius, distance_charter gives the distance to the nearest charter school, and
year_open is a vector of dummy variables indicating when the nearest charter school was
opened. For example, if year_of is coded as a 1 for a given observation, it indicates that
the nearest charter school was opened in that year. If the variable three_years_after is
coded as a 1, it indicates that the observation year is three years after the opening of the
nearest charter school. Further, if the variable three_years_before is coded as a 1, it
indicates that the observation year is three years before the opening of the nearest charter
school. This is intended to capture the competitive effect of the opening of the school in
subsequent years, as well as the possible competitive effect in the buildup to the opening
of the school. The results of this regression are in Table 8. Column 1 indicates the base
regression, with Column 2 representing a robustness check.
In the base regression (Column 1), both distance and count show up statistically
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on distance indicates that a greater distance to
the nearest charter increases API improvement, suggesting that a charter in close
proximity has a negative effect. The coefficient on count indicates that each additional
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charter school within a 5-mile radius reduces charter school API improvement by .05
percentage points. This result suggests that the presence of charter schools in an area
hurts the performance of TPSs. In the base regression, the only significant charter
opening indicator variables are those representing one, three, and four years after an
opening. The coefficients are negative as well, suggesting that charter school openings
are negative predictors of future API scores.
Column 2 introduces a robustness check in which I control for several
characteristics of the nearest charter school: total enrollment, percentage of students on
free or reduced lunches, percentage students who are minorities and API score of the
charter school. Due to data limitations, controlling for these variables reduces the sample
size. In this model, due to lower sample size, the negative coefficient on the variable for
count loses strength, becoming no longer significant at the 5% level. Also, the distance
variable switches signs, indicating that the effect of distance to the nearest charter schools
is not robust. An interesting result with this robustness check is that the coefficient on
year_of becomes statistically significant and negative, with a coefficient of -2.06, while
the coefficient on four_years_after loses power, no becoming longer statistically
significant. This result indicates that, controlling for charter school characteristics, the
opening of a charter school still hurts nearby TPSs, but the effect is stronger in the year of
or soon after its opening.
Overall, I find evidence to reject the hypothesis that charter schools exert a
positive competitive effect on nearby TPSs. To the contrary, I find that both the presence
of charter schools and the opening of new charter schools to be correlated with reductions
in TPS API improvement. Further, I find that these negative effects, once one controls for
charter school characteristics, are observed most strongly in the year that the charter
school opens and the year after. There is also some evidence that these negative effects
are observed three to four years after the opening of a charter school.
The two most likely explanations for the negative effect are loss of students and
loss of funding, which are actually very much intertwined. While past studies of Los
Angeles schools have not found charter schools to “skim” the highest performing
students from TPSs (Buddin, 2006), it could be that there are still unobservables at play
here. For example, while it has been shown that the highest performing students do not
disproportionately leave TPSs for charter schools, it could be that students with high
improvement potential disproportionately move from TPSs to charter schools. This sort
of bias could result in the observed negative effect—if students with high improvement
potential leave TPSs for charters, TPSs will experience lower improvement in years of
and after nearby charter school openings.
Second, loss of funding that comes with students leaving for charter schools could
negatively impact the performance of TPSs. Los Angeles public schools are funded based
on their student populations (Robertson, 2012). While this was previously cited as a
reason to think positive competition may take place, it could actually lower TPS
performance in years following the opening of nearby charter schools (assuming students
transfer from nearby TPSs to that charter). Even if schools have fewer students to
educate, loss of funding could force them to cut programs, fire teachers, or take other
measures likely to inhibit learning. Thus, the effect of the opening of charter schools
could run both directions, both stimulating competition and reducing a school’s
resources. These factors do not explain, though, why TPSs do not improve their
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performance in the years leading up to the opening of a charter school, when they know a
charter school will soon exist nearby, but have not yet experienced budget cuts. This
result calls into question any sort of positive competitive effect in elementary schools.
There are several potential issues with the presented results. First, the distance
variable is not a very precise measure of competitive effect. There are many possible
unobservables that could be associated with both closeness of the nearest charter school
and API improvement. This may explain why the distance variable switches sign based
on model specifications.
Second, I do not have data to account for a situation in which a charter school
opens near a TPS, and then another charter school opens even closer to the same TPS. In
this case, the data do not capture the effect of the first charter school, due to the fact that
the GIS program is only capable of finding and recording the nearest charter school. The
ability to find and record all instances of charter school openings would add depth to the
analysis.
Part 4: Endogeneity Checks and Determinants of Charter Location
In order to confirm that bias of charter school openings is not severely impacting
the results, I run auxiliary regressions on the determinants of charter school openings.
These tests can also help determine factors that influence the location and timing of
charter school openings. I specifically am testing for whether past changes in API scores
of TPSs encourage charters to open nearby. I model characteristics indicating charter
school proximity to each TPS as a function of the general control variables (from
Equation 1), API and percent change API, and their lags going back five years.
Charter_Proximityit=β1+ β2’APIit + β3’chAPI+ β4’Xit+ δt+ εit

(4)

The variables for charter proximity that I test are the number of charter schools within a
five mile radius of each TPS, the distance to the nearest charter school, and the indicator
variable year_of (coded as a 1 for the year the nearest charter school opens). I am
interested here in whether the coefficient on percent_change_API for the present year or
any lagged years is significant. This would indicate that charter location is endogenous to
the trends in API scores, which would challenge the results in the previous section. The
results of this test are in Appendix, Table 9.
With the number of charter schools in a 5-mile radius as the dependent variable,
several lags of both API and percent change in API are significant and negative. This
indicates that poor API scores in the past for TPSs are correlated with a higher number of
charter schools in the area. This somewhat calls into question the previous results linking
number of charter schools in an area to performance of TPSs. However, controlling for
past API changes in that regression should at least partly solve this issue. Further, the
relation between number of charters and performance is not the strongest evidence in that
section of a negative competitive effect, so the possible endogeneity issues should not
affect the conclusions. While several lags of API levels are also significant, this is not of
concern due to the fact that I use differenced API scores in the “competitive effects”
regression.
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Using the distance to the nearest charter school as the dependent variable, there
are no key variables that turn out significant, supporting the idea that the distance from a
TPS to the nearest charter is exogenously determined.
Finally, I run a probit regression with the dummy variable year_of on the left
hand side. In this model, only the second lag of percent change API is significant, and is
negative. The second lag’s negative coefficient indicates that API decline increases the
likelihood that a charter school will be opened nearby in the next two years. While this is
an interesting result, the fact that charters are generally planned more than two years
before opening mitigates concerns of endogeneity. Furthermore, even if this were still a
concern, controlling for lagged percent change in API in the competitive effects
regression is likely sufficient to resolve the issue.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
There are a few main points to take away from this study that are applicable to
education policy both in LA and around the country. First, according to this analysis,
although charter schools generally test better than traditional public schools, they actually
do not fare any better than TPSs once one controls for important variables.
Second, charter schools appear to be strongly preferable to TPSs only in the case
that the school is majority-black. In this case, though, they appear to greatly outperform
their TPS counterparts. This is not to say that converting all majority-black schools to
charters would strongly improve educational outcomes, though. There are certainly other
factors contributing to this result beyond the charter-TPS distinction. It is important to
further identify why it is that majority black charter schools do particularly well, and try
to reproduce those factors in other schools.
Third, individual charter schools tend to perform better if they have existed for a
longer period of time. Thus, it could be that, with time to grow and evolve, charter
schools might match or surpass TPSs in performance. Additional research should further
investigate the link between years in existence and performance in both TPSs and charter
schools.
Fourth, conversion charter schools generally score higher on the API than startup
charters. This may be due to the fact that conversion charters can be considered to have a
“head start” on startup charters, with facilities and students often in place from the
beginning. Perhaps school districts should focus more on converting low-performing
TPSs to charters than creating entirely new charter schools.
Finally, there is no evidence of a positive competitive effect from charter school
openings; rather, the opening of charter schools is correlated with lower TPS
performance. I argue that this result is likely due to a combination of loss of funding and
loss of students with improvement potential.
Maintaining a competitive school environment in which funding follows the
student while not harming failing schools is a challenge for policymakers. I think that
funding should continue to follow students. That being said, special attention should be
paid to turning around failing schools that lose students. Perhaps some sort of hybrid
scheme in which funding continues to follow students, but at a decreasing rate, would be
desirable. Further research should better examine how to create a competitive system
without overly punishing students and teachers at low-performing schools.
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In terms of the possible loss of students with improvement potential, I do not
think this is necessarily problematic. Motivated students and families should have the
chance to change schools and maximize learning opportunities. Ultimately, mobility in
public school education should lead to a more successful system.
The main conclusions from this study support the notion that we must use caution
before declaring charter schools to be the solution to America’s primary education woes.
This paper refutes, at least in the case of Los Angeles County, two claims often made by
charter school advocates: first, that charter schools perform better than public schools,
and second, that charter school openings induce TPSs to perform better. This does not
mean that there is no role for charter schools to play in this country’s education reforms.
It does mean, though, that we should seek to construct policies that will lead to charter
school success while at the same time promoting the improvement of traditional public
schools.
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Appendix
Table 1
Column1
API
%∆API
Enrollment
% Free or Reduced
Lunches
% Minority
Avg Class Size
Pupils per Teacher

Charters TPSs
788.92
3.7
464.1

719.92
1.92
688.95

56% 66.30%
71.40% 81.10%
20.78
21.9
22.3
20.2

Table 2: Base regression
VARIABLES
charter
% on free meals
% minority
Pupils per teacher
Number of teachers
enrollment
White
Asian
Black
Other
R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
API

(2)
logAPI

(3)
∆API

(4)
%∆API

-6.958
(8.49)
-1.47***
(0.124)
-.992***
(0.275
0.106
(0.174)
0.667
(0.809)
-.0685*
(0.0354)
4.050
(11.76)
82.88***
(7.587)
-17.4***
(2.768)
67.83***
(14.18)
0.760

-0.0143
(0.0106)
-0.002***
(0.000162)
-.00134***
(0.000381)
0.000117
(0.000218)
0.000852
(0.00112)
-.0001**
(4.82e-05)
0.000237
(0.0170)
0.105***
(0.00946)
-0.0251***
(0.00386)
0.0850***
(.015)
0.737

-10.32*
(6.071)
-1.3**
(0.117)
-.791***
0.237)
0.0100
(0.138)
0.755
(0.727)
-.068**
(0.0334)
6.312
(10.59)
72.86***
(6.995)
-19.8***
(2.670)
24.91***
(3.65)
0.836

-0.649
(1.077)
-0.203***
(0.0177)
-0.100***
(0.0378)
-0.00735
(0.0238)
0.127
(0.112)
-0.0109**
(0.00506)
1.657
(1.655)
11.34***
(1.039)
-3.513***
(0.413)
2.225***
(.597)
0.818

All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent
variable are used in Columns 3 and 4.
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Table 3: Base regression with charter interactions
VARIABLES
charter
% on free meals
% minority
Pupils per teacher
Number of teachers
enrollment
White
Asian
Black
Other
charterblack
charterwhite
charter% minority
charter% on free meals
charter pupils per teacher
R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
API
-172***
(41.49)
-1.47***
(0.129)
-1.05***
(0.311)
0.0780
(0.163)
0.673
(0.796)
-.0685*
(0.0350)
1.444
(12.99)
82.47***
(7.667)
-23.2***
(3.290)
67.75***
(14.39)
51.32***
(13.93)
87.58**
(35.51)
1.315***
(0.254)
0.200
(0.405)
0.643
(.85)
0.762

(2)
logAPI
-0.239***
(0.0506)
-.00197***
(0.000168)
-.00142***
(0.00 430)
8.75e-05
(0.000207)
0.000856
(0.00111)
-.0001**
(4.77e-05)
-0.00348
(0.0188)
0.104***
(0.00959)
-0.0332***
(0.00445)
0.0849***
(0.0150)
0.0722***
(0.0184)
0.126***
(0.0468)
0.00180***
(0.000341)
0.000331
(0.000532)
0.000580
(.001)
0.739

(3)
∆API
-128.0**
(48.66)
-1.31***
(0.122)
-.844***
(0.264)
-0.0102
(0.144)
0.768
(0.721)
-.0694**
(0.0331)
4.562
(11.51)
73.15***
(7.057)
-24.4***
(3.469)
24.77***
(3.724)
52.10***
(16.33)
51.08
(40.68)
1.410***
(0.304)
-0.492
(0.507)
0.599
(.673)
0.838

(4)
%∆API
-17.65**
(8.084)
-0.203***
(0.0181)
-0.106**
(0.0420)
-0.0105
(0.0247)
0.129
(0.111)
-.0109**
(0.00503)
1.437
(1.814)
11.34***
(1.050)
-4.395***
(0.491)
2.179***
(0.605)
9.680***
(3.247)
7.770
(7.290)
0.175***
(0.0450)
-0.0396
(0.0854)
0.0799
(.117)
0.819

All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent
variable are used in Columns 3 and 4.
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Table 4: Comparing charter vs.
TPS
VARIABLES
% on free meals
% minority
Pupils per teacher
Number of teachers
White
Asian
Black
Other
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TPS
API

Charter
API

TPS
%∆API

Charter
%∆API

-1.45***
(0.132)
-1.08***
(0.295)
-0.474
(0.336)
-0.70***
(0.151)
0.524
(12.32)
81.60***
(7.713)
-22.4***
(3.330)
68.06***
(13.83)
11,569
0.768

-1.293**
(0.410)
0.152
(0.277)
0.555
(0.825)
0.0198
(0.474)
78.20*
(37.76)

-0.204***
(0.0184)
-0.113***
(0.0397)
-0.0928
(0.0580)
-0.091***
(0.0197)
1.253
(1.738)
11.31***
(1.073)
-4.153***
(0.506)
10.31*
(5.441)
11,103
0.822

-0.205**
(0.0715)
0.0268
(0.0351)
0.0530
(0.105)
0.0965
(0.0702)
6.080
(6.658)

33.62*
(16.35)

338
0.529

3.822
(3.497)

303
0.671

All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent variable are
used in Columns 3 and 4.

Table 5: TPS and Charter API performance by largest ethnic group
Charter Schools
Largest Ethnic
Group
Black
Latino
White

TPS
Mean
API
757.01
721.93
858

Largest Ethnic Group
Black
Latino
White
Filipino
Asian

Mean
API
663.72
683.70
831.57
857.4
849.13

Note: there are no majority Filipino or Asian charter schools
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Table 6: Investigating the impact of years in existence and type (startup vs. conversion)
on performance.
VARIABLES
years_existed
startup
% on free meals
% minority
Pupils per teacher
Number of teachers
White
Black
R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
API

(2)
%∆API

1.405***
(0.376)
-71.04*
(35.79)
-0.994**
(0.340)
0.476*
(0.222)
-0.494
(0.867)
-1.73***
(.294)
71.29
(41.25)
64.14***
(11.49)
0.600

0.0273
(0.0750)
-7.682
(5.450)
-0.177**
(0.0606)
0.0503
(0.0391)
-0.0983
(0.0711)
-0.0822
(.048)
5.091
(8.274)
9.440**
(2.753)
0.701

All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent variable
are used in Columns 2.
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Table 7: List of charter schools in LA County, and how often they appear as the “nearest”
to a TPS
Charter

Frequency

Academia Moderna

5

Academia Semillas del Pueblo

7

Accelerated

1

Antelope Valley Learning Academy

1

Ararat Charter

13

Aveson School of Leaders

19

Barack Obama Charter

108

CHIME Institute's Schwarzenegger Commun

9

CLAS Affirmation

4

Camino Nuevo Academy #2

4

Camino Nuevo Charter Academy

3

Camino Nuevo Elementary No. 3

1

Canyon Elementary

5

Carpenter Community Charter

2

Celerity Dyad Charter

7

Celerity Nascent Charter

2

Celerity Octavia Charter

15

Celerity Troika Charter

30

Center for Advanced Learning

2

Children of Promise Preparatory Academy

2

Citizens of the World Charter

2

Colfax Charter Elementary

15

Community Magnet Charter Elementary

1

Equitas Academy Charter

2

Fenton Avenue Charter

49

Full Circle Learning Academy

20

Futuro College Preparatory Elementary

44

Gabriella Charter

7

Garr Academy of Math and Entrepreneuria

3

Global Education Academy

5

Goethe International Charter

2

ICEF Vista Elementary Academy

5

Ingenium Charter

11

Jardin de la Infancia

1

KIPP Empower Academy

1

KIPP Raices Academy

241
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Larchmont Charter

2

Larchmont Charter-West Hollywood

3

Los Feliz Charter School for the Arts

6

Magnolia Science Academy 7

11

Marquez Avenue Elementary

3

Milagro Charter

15

Montague Charter Academy

15

Multicultural Learning Center

7

N.E.W. Academy Canoga Park

1

N.E.W. Academy of Science and Arts

1

New City

5

Ocean Charter

5

Open Charter Magnet

15

Our Community Charter

13

Pacoima Charter Elementary

1

Palisades Charter Elementary

2

San Jose Charter Academy

8

Santa Monica Boulevard Community Charter

3

Today's Fresh Start Charter

1

Today's Fresh Start Charter School Inglewood 73
Valley Charter Elementary

22

View Park Preparatory Accelerated Chart

2

Watts Learning Center

1

Westwood Elementary

13

Wilder's Preparatory Academy Charter

3

Wisdom Academy for Young Scientists

13

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/11

22

Trachtman: Competitive Effects of Charter School Openings

Table 8: Assessing the impact of geographic proximity and opening of charter schools on
TPS performance
VARIABLES
distance_charter
count_charter
year_of
one_year_before
two_year_before
three_year_before
four_year_before
one_years_after
two_years_after
three_years_after
four_years_after
% minority
% on free meals
Pupils per teacher
class_size

(1)
%∆API
.0000339***
(8.78e-06)
-0.0543**
(0.0239)
-0.217
(0.852)
0.0858
(0.793)
-0.388
(0.585)
0.178
(0.487)
0.292
(0.500)
-1.060**
(0.518)
-0.401
(0.886)
-2.536***
(0.660)
-1.927***
(0.697)
-0.153***
(0.0369)
-0.237***
(0.0219)
-0.0439
(0.0353)
-0.187
(0.117)

charter_enrollment
charter_% on free meals
charter_% minority
charter_API
R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.859

(2)
%∆API
-.0000204
(1.13e-05)
-0.0366**
(0.0170)
-2.062***
(0.696)
-0.636
(0.978)
-1.547*
(0.891)
-1.116*
(0.602)
-0.226
(0.508)
-1.779**
(0.689)
-0.563
(1.017)
-2.872***
(0.827)
-0.934
(0.785)
-0.156***
(0.0417)
-0.227***
(0.0282)
-0.139
(0.108)
-0.234*
(0.132)
-0.00440***
(0.00116)
-0.0295**
(0.0140)
-0.0140
(0.0204)
0.000843
(0.00393)
0.855

All columns include fixed year effects and four lags of the dependent variable. Also
included in the model are indicators for majority ethnic group and controls for the
distance to the nearest private school, and number of private schools within 5 miles.
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Table 9: Endogeneity check
VARIABLES
% on free meals
% minority
White
Asian
Black
Other
API
APIlag
API2lag
API3lag
API4lag
API5lag
API6lag
%∆API
%∆API1lag
%∆API2lag
%∆API3lag
%∆API4lag
%∆API5lag
%∆API6lag

R-squared
Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
count

(2)
distance

0.0747**
(0.0348)
0.0835*
(0.0444)
6.068***
(2.256)
1.983
(1.671)
1.374
(1.792)
8.278***
(1.065)
0.00805
(0.00678)
-0.00739
(0.00462)
-0.00668***
(0.00240)
-0.00562**
(0.00254)
-0.00175
(0.00421)
-0.00740***
(0.00189)
-0.0125**
(0.00521)
-0.0584**
(0.0290)
-0.0510***
(0.0171)
-0.0457**
(0.0200)
-0.0406
(0.0272)
-0.0655***
(0.0164)
-0.0470**
(0.0235)
0.00951*
(0.00501)

-352.0***
(130.9)
-626.6**
(305.3)
-27,532***
(6,633)
5,480
(8,092)
-13,395*
(7,977)
-32,073***
(6,442)
-104.4***
(31.79)
7.759
(16.90)
14.78
(15.42)
-12.29
(12.49)
-4.457
(15.39)
18.22
(15.42)
7.613
(13.61)
72.30
(103.9)
72.64
(71.05)
-22.76
(98.12)
74.19
(90.01)
115.4
(94.45)
37.28
(66.12)
14.64
(17.09)

0.123

0.073

(3)
year_of
-0.00398**
(0.00185)
0.0116***
(0.00417)
0.223
(0.221)
-0.103
(0.100)
0.0753
(0.0780)

0.000664
(0.000656)
-0.000647
(0.000819)
0.00126
(0.000885)
-0.00176
(0.00111)
-0.000779
(0.000803)
0.000500
(0.000676)
-0.000952**
(0.000482)
-0.00183
(0.00353)
-0.000596
(0.00328)
-0.0102**
(0.00471)
-0.000955
(0.00321)
0.00202
(0.00404)
-0.00302
(0.00291)
0.00131*
(0.000696)

Year fixed effects are included in all models. Column 3 represents a probit
model.
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Figure 1: API distribution for charter schools
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Figure 2: API distribution for traditional public schools
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Figure 3: Distribution of Charter Schools’ Opening
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Figure 4: Location of TPSs and charter schools in LA
County

Small circles represent traditional public elementary schools, while large squares represent
elementary charter schools.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/11
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Figure 5: Histogram of distance from TPS to nearest charter school.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the number of charter schools within 5 miles of TPS
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